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Abstract
Security trade-offs have previously been established for one-way bit commitment. We study this
trade-off in two superselection settings. We show that for an ‘abelian’ superselection rule (exemplified
by particle conservation) the standard trade-off between sealing and binding properties still holds. For
the non-abelian case (exemplified by angular momentum conservation) the security trade-off can be
more subtle, which we illustrate by showing that if the bit commitment is forced to be ancilla-free, an
asymptotically secure quantum bit commitment is possible.
PACS: 03.670.-a, 03.67.Dd
1 Introduction
The question of whether the no-go result for quantum bit commitment [1], [2], [3] remains valid in the
presence of superselection rules has been addressed by several recent papers [4], [5], [6]. The most general
result is described in Ref. [5], where the authors prove that secure quantum bit commitment is impossible
even with general superselection rules. The authors of this paper distinguish security in the case of ‘abelian’
superselection rules (such as particle conservation) and ‘nonabelian’ superselection rules in which the im-
posed symmetry is described by a non-abelian group. In both cases the authors prove the impossibility
of establishing a secure bit-commitment protocol. In this paper we point out that the no-go result for the
non-abelian case is fairly non-trivial; we show that if the cheating strategies are forced to be ancilla-free,
an asymptotically secure protocol can be found. In contrast, for the abelian case (or in the absence of
superselection rules) the ‘no-ancilla’ enforcement does not alter the security trade-offs for a one-way bit
commitment (called a ‘purification bit commitment’ in Ref. [7]).
2 One-way Bit Commitment Protocol
We repeat the definition in Ref. [7] of this important class of bit commitment (BC) protocols:
Definition 1 (One-Way Bit Commitment Protocol, BC) [7] In this protocol, Bob begins with no quantum
state of his own, Alice begins with a two-part Hilbert space Hp⊗Ht (“proof” and “token”). Alice chooses
to commit to bit b. Alice prepares one of two orthogonal states |χb〉 in her total Hilbert space. In the
commit phase, Alice transmits to Bob the state in Ht which we denote by ρb; in the unveiling phase, Alice
transmits the state inHp to Bob; Bob determines the committed bit by projectively measuring the state using
orthogonal projectors {Π0,Π1,Πfail}.
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3 ONE-WAY BIT COMMITMENT WITH SUPERSELECTION RULES 2
This is certainly not the most general quantum bit commitment protocol, which would permit more
than one round of communication. The security trade-offs of one-way BC protocols have been described as
follows, see Ref. [7]. Two scenarios are considered: 1) Alice is honest, but Bob tries to cheat by learning
the bit in the commit phase. 2) Bob is honest, but Alice tries to cheat by changing her committed bit after
the commit phase. In case 1), Bob is trying to make his “information gain” G(SB) nonzero, defined as the
difference between his probability of estimating Alice’s commitment correctly in the commit phase when
he employs cheating strategy SB, and when he is honest,
G(SB) = PE(S
B)− 1/2. (1)
In case 2), Alice is trying to make her “control” C(SA) nonzero, defined as the difference between her
probability of unveiling whatever bit she desires when she implements SA, and when she is honest,
C(SA) = PU (S
A)− 1/2. (2)
Then, the security of any given protocol can be characterized by the maximum of these two quantities:
Gmax ≡ max
SB
G(SB),
Cmax ≡ max
SA
C(SA). (3)
For one-way bit commitment protocols it has been established [7] that
Gmax =
1
2
D(ρ0, ρ1) =
1
4
tr |ρ0 − ρ1|. (4)
Cmax =
1
2
F (ρ0, ρ1) =
1
2
tr |√ρ0√ρ1|, (5)
where F (., .) is the fidelity function and D(., .) is the trace-distance function. Notably, the cheating strate-
gies that achieve these optima do not make use of ancillas: Alice’s cheating strategy is the creation of a
b−independent state potentially followed by unitary rotation, whereas Bob’s cheating strategy is a complete
von Neumann measurement projecting in the eigenbasis of ρ0 − ρ1, achieving the trace distance. Let us
define what we mean by an ancilla-free bit commitment:
Definition 2 (Ancilla-Free One-Way Bit Commitment Protocol, AFBC) A one-way bit commitment pro-
tocol in which we restrict the cheating strategies to ones which have no access to additional quantum sys-
tems, i.e. ancillas. Thus cheating strategies consist of local unitary transformations and complete von
Neumann measurements.
3 One-way Bit Commitment with Superselection Rules
To proceed with this analysis, we must stipulate how the one-way bit commitment protocol is constrained
by superselection rules [8]. 1 We also refer to [10] for a detailed description of how superselection rules
and their associated symmetry groups impose constraints.
1The distinction between selection rules and superselection rules is not always very clear. At an informal level one may think
that superselection rules are due to fundamental laws in nature and thus never to be violated, whereas selection rules are of a more
relative nature, valid for the particular energy scales at hand, or due to technological/practical constraints. A different and more
precise definition was given in the original paper [9]. There superselection rules are defined as selection rules, i.e. a dynamical
conservation laws, with the additional restriction that off-diagonal matrix elements in the conserved quantum number basis cannot
be distinguished by measurement. These definitions of selection and superselection rules seem to leave open the possibility for an
initial condition that is a superposition of different quantum numbers. In this section we specify in detail what we mean by bit
commitment constrained by the superselection rules.
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We assume that Alice and Bob’s actions have to obey a local superselection rule which can be given
by a Hermitian operator KA and KB. We will discuss two examples here: 1) KA/B is the local particle
number NA/B . 2) KA/B is a local total angular momentum operator J2A/B ; this is a ‘nonabelian’ case (the
symmetry group is that of space rotations).
Here then are the restrictions that we will require for the one-way bit commitment. These restrictions
include the possible cheating strategies of the parties:
1. The states in the token+proof Hilbert space in Alice’s lab are eigenvectors of KA with the same
eigenvalue, say k. Thus, KA|χ0〉 = k|χ0〉 and KA|χ1〉 = k|χ1〉. If Alice cheats and she chooses to
create other states, then these should also be eigenstates of KA. 2
2. Any action that Alice performs before the commit phase must involve unitary transformations that
leave the eigenvalue k unchanged, i.e., [U,KA] = 0.
3. After the commit phase, any unitaries performed by Alice must satisfy [U,KA] = 0. Likewise for
Bob when he is given the token: [U,KB ] = 0.
4. Any measurements that Bob performs must respect the superselection rule. Thus, in the commit phase
(when Bob might wish to cheat) any measurement projector Π of Bob on the token space must satisfy
[Π,KB ] = 0. In the unveiling phase, the same must be true for the joint token+proof Hilbert space in
Bob’s possesion: [Π,KB ] = 0.
If the cheating strategy is not required to be ancilla-free, Bob could create a state of definite quantum
number kB in his lab before he receives the token. After he has received the token, he should respect
the conservation rule on his total token+ancilla space, but the ancilla may still help him to do a better
measurement.
Let us use the following notation: since a one-way BC protocol is completely specified once the orthog-
onal pair |χ0,1〉 is agreed upon, we will refer to this protocol as BC(|χ0,1〉). If the protocol has the above
superselection rule restrictions imposed involving operator K , we will refer to this protocol as BCK(|χ0,1〉).
If the protocol is forced to be ancilla-free we write AFBCK(|χ0,1〉).
4 Our results
We find that in the presence of particle number superselection rules, the security of one-way BC is rigorously
unchanged, see Section 5:
∀|χ0,1〉 such thatN |χ0,1〉 = n|χ0,1〉,
Gmax(BCN (|χ0,1〉)) = Gmax(BC(|χ0,1〉)) = Gmax(AFBC(|χ0,1〉)),
Cmax(BCN (|χ0,1〉)) = Cmax(BC(|χ0,1〉)) = Cmax(AFBC(|χ0,1〉)). (6)
However, in the presence of angular momentum superselection rules (operator J2; a ‘nonabelian’ case),
a one-way BC with arbitrarily high security can be devised if we force the scheme to be ancilla-free
∃ |χ0,1(j)〉, such that J2|χ0,1(j)〉 = j(j + 1)|χ0,1〉,
Gmax(AFBCJ2(|χ0,1(j)〉)) = 0,
Cmax(AFBCJ2(|χ0,1(j)〉)) → 0 for j →∞. (7)
We do not have a rigorous proof of the statement about the asymptotic behavior of Cmax(AFBCJ2(|χ0,1〉)),
but we conjecture a formula for the fidelity function which coincides with numerical data up to j = 11, and
which implies the asymptotic security just stated; see Section 6.
2In fact the security of both our schemes does not change if we permit Alice to create any state χ.
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5 Particle Conservation
We now prove Eq. (6). In Ref. [6] Mayers first proved the simplest case in which the fact that the protocol
is completely sealing makes it completely unbinding, i.e. Alice can always change her commitment. The
arguments here are a straightforward extension of this simple case. The number operator is additive over
tensor product Hilbert spaces, so we can write
N = Nt +Np. (8)
This means that if, as we assume, N |χ0,1〉 = n|χ0,1〉, then these states must have the form
|χb〉 =
n∑
it,ip,m=0
cb(it, ip,m)| ip, n−m〉p| it,m〉t, (9)
that is, if the token system has m particles, the proof system must have n −m particles. The labels ip and
it denote other quantum numbers characterizing the states. It is understood that the range of the it and ip
sums can depend on m (i.e., they depend on the local particle number).
The security parameters defined above depend only on the reduced density operators on the token sub-
system of the two states. For the states of the form of Eq. (9), these can be written as
ρb =
n∑
it,jt,m=0
∑
ip
cb(it, ip,m)c
∗
b (jt, ip,m)| it,m〉〈jt,m | =
n⊕
m=0
pb,mσˆb,m, (10)
where pb,m is the probability of each m, and σˆb,m is a normalized density operator in each m sector:
tr σˆb,m = 1.
Consider what happens if Bob cheats. The ideal optimal measurement for Bob that he can do to achieve
Eq. (4) is a complete von Neumann measurement in the eigenbasis of ρ0−ρ1. But, because of Eq. (10), this
eigenbasis is also an eigenbasis of the particle number of the token system and given the superselection rule,
Bob is allowed to do this optimal measurement. So, Bob can gain exactly the same amount of information
in the protocol constrained by superselection rules, Gmax(BCN (|χ0,1〉)) = Gmax(BC(|χ0,1〉)).
Next, we consider what happens if Alice cheats. We will show that
Cmax(BCN (|χ0,1〉) = Cmax(BC(|χ0,1〉). First of all, due to the block-diagonal character of ρ0 and
ρ1 we can write
Cmax(BC(|χ0,1〉) = 1
2
tr |√ρ0√ρ1| = 1
2
n∑
m=0
√
p0,mp1,mF (σˆ0,m, σˆ1,m). (11)
On the other hand, Uhlmann’s theorem for the fidelity function F is also written as:
F (ρ0, ρ1) = max
Up
|〈χ0 |Up ⊗ It|χ1〉| = max
Up
ℜ(〈χ0 |Up ⊗ It|χ1〉). (12)
We arrive at this last form by recognizing that Up can have any arbitrary global phase. In Ref. [7] it is shown
that C = |〈χ0 |Up ⊗ It|χ1〉|/2 can be achieved if Alice creates the b-independent state
|χ〉 ∝ (|χ0〉+ e−iarg(〈χ0 |Up⊗It|χ1〉)|χ1〉) (13)
prior to the commit phase. If she decides during the commit phase that b = 0, she leaves that state unchanged
and sends it to Bob; if she wants b = 1, she applies the optimal U †p of Eq. (12) to the proof system that she
still holds.
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But in the presence of the charge superselection rule, it is not possible to do the unconstrained max-
imization of Eq. (12); we must respect constraints 2. and 3. above imposed by the superselection rules,
which require that Up be block diagonal in the charge index. We observe that Alice can create the cheating
state χ of Eq. (13) while respecting the superselection rule. Thus we can write Cmax in this case as a
constrained maximization:
Cmax(BCN (|χ0,1〉)) = 1
2
max
Up=
⊕n
m=0 Um,p
ℜ(〈χ0 |Up ⊗ It|χ1〉) (14)
In order to evaluate this expression, we rewrite the states of Eq. (9) as
|χb〉 =
n∑
m=0
√
pb,m|χb,m〉. (15)
Putting (15) into (14) and working out the expression gives
Cmax(BCN (|χ0,1〉)) = 1
2
n∑
m=0
√
p0,mp1,mF (σˆ0,m, σˆ1,m). (16)
In other words, we obtain the claimed equality Cmax(BCN (|χ0,1〉) = Cmax(BC(|χ0,1〉).
We will now find a very different situation for angular-momentum conservation. The idea is to find two
states χb for b = 0, 1 such that the local density matrices for Bob, ρb, look the same given the superselection
rule. This implies that the diagonal elements of ρb in the local definite angular momentum basis must be the
same. The off-diagonal elements can be different however, and we can try to adjust these free parameters
so as to limit Alice’s cheating strategies. In the case of particle conservation there is no room to adjust free
parameters since the off-diagonal elements of ρb in the number basis are always zero, see Eq. (10). This is
the essential difference between the abelian and the non-abelian case.
6 Angular Momentum Conservation
We introduce a family of one-way bit commitment protocols, one for each total angular momentum quan-
tum number j (2j ∈ Z+), although we will only discuss the integer case in detail). Alice’s two states χ0,1
are states with total angular momentum jtot = j and mtot = j. We denote the Clebsch-Gordan coefficients
as C(jA,mA, jB ,mB, jtot,mtot) where jA,mA are the quantum numbers of the ‘proof’ spin (kept by Al-
ice, initially) and jB ,mB are the quantum numbers of the ‘token’ spin (sent to Bob). Unlike the number
operator, total angular momentum is not an additive quantity (herein lies the crucial difference between
the security of the two cases), i.e. the two local angular momenta jA and jB can give rise to total angular
momentum between |jA − jB | and jA + jB . We take states for fixed j to be
χ0(j) =
2j∑
jB=0
√
βjB
j∑
mA=−j
C(j,mA, jB , j −mA, j, j)| j,mA〉p| jB , j −mA〉t, (17)
χ1(j) =
2j∑
jB=0
(−1)jB
√
βjB
j∑
mA=−j
C(j,mA, jB , j −mA, j, j)| j,mA〉p| jB , j −mA〉t. (18)
Of course, the z-component of the local spin cannot be larger than the total local spin; we impose this in
the above equations by taking the the Clebsch-Gordan coefficients C(j,mA, jB , j −mA, j, j) to be zero if
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j −mA > jB . The β-coefficients obey the following constraints:
2j∑
jB=0
βjB = 1, (19)
2j∑
jB=0
(−1)jBβjB = 0, (20)
∀ jB , βjB ≥ 0. (21)
The first equation enforces the normalization and the second equation enforces the orthogonality of χ0 and
χ1. Before considering Alice’s strategies, which will give us additional equations for the β-coefficients, let
us consider Bob’s cheating strategies. Due to the superselection rule his measurement has to be diagonal in
the total angular momentum of his particle which implies that he will not be able to detect any difference
in the terms of ρ0 and ρ1 that are off-diagonal in the jB-basis. The states χb(j) are chosen such that the
on-diagonal terms of ρ0 and ρ1 are identical. This implies that for all j, Gmax(AFBCJ2(|χ0,1〉)) = 0.
In order to analyze Alice’s cheating ability, we work out the expression for the fidelity F in Eq. (5) which
provides an upper bound on her cheating strategies. Note that the expressions for χb have the Schmidt form:
|χb〉 =
∑
mA
√
λmA | j,mA〉|φmAb 〉, (22)
where φmAb are normalized orthogonal vectors:
|φmAb 〉 =
1√
λmA
2j∑
jB=0
(−1)b.jB
√
βjBC(j,mA, jB , j −mA, j, j)| jB , j −mA〉. (23)
The Schmidt coefficients in Eq. (22) are independent of the bit b:
λmA =
∑
jB
βjBC
2(j,mA, jB , j −mA, j, j). (24)
Also note that for these states
〈φmA0 |φ
m′A
1 〉 =
1
λmA
KmAδmAm′A , (25)
where
KmA =
2j∑
jB=0
(−1)jBβjBC2(j,mA, jB , j −mA, j, j). (26)
With these tools, Uhlmann’s fidelity can be written as
F (ρ0, ρ1) = tr
√√
ρ0ρ1
√
ρ0 =
∑
mA
|KmA | =
∑
mA
smAKmA , (27)
where smA = sign(KmA) and thus
F =
j∑
mA=−j
smA
2j∑
jB=0
(−1)jBβjBC2(j,mA, jB , j −mA, j, j). (28)
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We arrive at a piecewise linear program: determine the vector ~β which minimizes F under the constraints
given by Eq. (21). For completeness, let us state the Clebsch-Gordan coefficients as they appear in the
expression for KmA :
C2(j,mA, jB , j −mA, j, j) =
(−mA+j+jB
−mA+j
)( mA+j
mA−j+jB
)
(2j+jB+1
2j+1
) , 0 ≤ jB ≤ 2j, 1 ≤ mA ≤ j, mA ≥ j − jB ,
C2(j,mA, jB , j −mA, j, j) = 0, 0 ≤ jB ≤ 2j, 1 ≤ mA ≤ j, mA < j − jB . (29)
(That is, a binomial coeficient outside its usual range should be taken to be zero.)
6.1 Numerical Analysis
For each integer j we have investigated this piecewise linear program numerically. (We do not report the
half-integer j results here, they work out similarly.). We have done the minimization up to j = 11 and we
observe the following patterns. As it turns out, in all solutions we find that βk = 0 for j + 2 ≤ k ≤ 2j.
Secondly, in every case, the terms in Eq. (28) for mA > 0 are identically zero. This gives us a set of linear
equalities for βjB :
∀mA : 1 ≤ mA ≤ j,
2j∑
jB=0
(−1)jBβjBC2(j,mA, jB , j −mA, j, j) = 0. (30)
Thirdly, in alternating cases (j even or j odd), we find that s−1 and s0 are {+1,−1} and {−1,+1}. In
addition, the remaining terms in Eq. (28), for mA < −1, are also identically zero. For example, the
solutions for j = 1, 2, 3 are
• j = 1: β0,1,2 = {29 , 12 , 518}, leading to the sign assignments s−1,0,1 = {+1,−1, x} where x implies
that s1 is irrelevant in the minimization. This leads to F = 13 .
• j = 2: β0,1,2,3,4 = { 320 , 925 , 720 , 750 , 0}, leading to the sign assignments s−2,−1,0,1,2 = {x,−1,+1, x, x}.
For these β values, F = 110 .
• j = 3: β0,1,2,3,4,5,6 = { 425 , 27 , 78245 , 314 , 33490 , 0, 0}, leading to the sign assignments
s−3,−2,−1,0,1,2,3 = {x, x,+1,−1, , x, x, x}. For these β values, F = 135 .
Most importantly, we have observed that for all cases up to j = 11, we find optimal values of F that
agree with the simple formula:
F =
[(
2j + 1
j + 1
)]−1
. (31)
As is clear from this formula, which we conjecture to correspond to a feasible solution for the ~β-vector for
all j, F goes to zero exponentially fast as j →∞ which implies the security of the protocol.
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